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There is an increasing amount of work on the details of Kant’s engagement with issues 
in eighteenth-century aesthetic and biological theory that may suggest other attractive ways 
of understanding the substantive unity of Kant’s approach to beauty and biology in the 
CJ. Kant scholars will want to weigh Zuckert’s controversial claims about a radically new, 
future-oriented conception of human subjectivity against the evidence generated by this 
contextual work in deciding for themselves whether she provides a convincing interpretation 
of Kant’s aims and positions. Regardless of where one stands on its central thesis, however, 
it would be difficult to deny that this book deserves the attention of anyone interested in 
the systematic structure of the CJ or in Kant’s relation to post-Kantian German thought.
M a r k  F i s h e r
Penn State University
Jon Stewart. A History of Hegelianism in Golden Age Denmark. Tome I, The Heiberg Period: 
1824–1836. København: Søren Kierkegaard Research Center—C. A. Reitzel, 2007. 
Pp. xxi + 629. Cloth, $65.00.
This is the first of three “tomes” of Jon Stewart’s habilitationisskrift in philosophy at the 
University of Copenhagen; the second concerns The Martensen Period: 1837–1842, and the 
third Kierkegaard and the Left-Hegelian Period: 1842–1860. Together they make up volume 3 of 
Stewart’s series Danish Golden Age Studies (København: Reitzel, 2007–). Their purpose is “to 
put forth the basic information about the Danish Hegel reception in a clear and readable 
fashion” (xxi). Such information needs to be put forth because, unlike Hegel’s reception 
throughout the rest of Europe and beyond, Danish Hegelianism remains largely but unjustly 
neglected in scholarly circles (2). Many of the primary texts are available only in Danish, “a 
small language not widely read outside Scandinavia” (1–2), and are not readily accessible 
even to those who do read it. (Stewart himself is helping to rectify this situation in his series 
of translations, Texts from Golden Age Denmark [København: C. A. Reitzel, 2005–].)
The present tome describes the first phase of Danish Hegelianism, under the banner of 
the aesthetic and literary arbiter of taste, J. L. Heiberg (1791–1860). As Stewart amply shows, 
Heiberg’s explicit attempt to popularize Hegel’s philosophy was not particularly successful, 
either in his periodical Københavns flyvende Post, at his teaching position at the Royal Military 
College, or elsewhere. He produced no dedicated Hegelian students, and—with the excep-
tion of On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age (1833)—his own Hegelian writings 
did not prompt lasting discussion. (Danish Hegelianism would not become really pervasive 
until H. L. Martensen, as presented in tome 2 of this study.) Moreover, Heiberg himself 
did not have a trained philosopher’s knowledge of the details of Hegel’s own thought; but 
for this very reason, he proved to be more than a mere parrot of Hegel.
Stewart’s study details Heiberg’s treatment of human freedom (in the context of the 
famous “Howitz Controversy” regarding Danish judicial reform), his ongoing attempt to 
formulate an aesthetic theory along broadly Hegelian lines (before the availability of He-
gel’s own Lectures on the topic), his philosophy of language, his “speculative logic,” and his 
controversial On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age, where he presents his views 
on the relation of philosophy to religion.
To this reviewer, while Stewart unquestionably presents a wealth of sorely needed infor-
mation and detail, he seems concerned to refute views that are no longer seriously held, 
if indeed they ever were. Granted, the Danish Hegelians are too little known today. But 
does any informed person nowadays seriously hold, perhaps as a result of Kierkegaard’s 
unrelenting criticism of them, that they were simply parrots of Hegelian orthodoxy and 
can therefore be ignored? It is one thing to supply the necessary information; it is quite 
another to suppose that those who do not have it think it is unneeded or non-existent.
Again, Stewart takes Heiberg to task for claiming in a letter to Hegel (1825) that the 
latter’s philosophy “still does not seem to have made its way to Denmark,” and for the claim 
that his own On Human Freedom (1824) was “the first Danish work which gave a glimpse 
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into Hegel’s philosophy” (70). If anyone ever took these claims to mean literally that no 
Dane had heard of Hegel earlier, or knew anything at all about his views, with or without 
having had the slightest influence on the Danish Hegel-reception, that view is decisively 
refuted by Stewart, who cites Henrik Steffens, von Berger, Oehlenschläger, Baggesen, and 
others as exceptions (chapter 1). Nearly eclipsed by all this is the fact that F. C. Sibbern, 
who dominated the University of Copenhagen for half a century (and was the director of 
Kierkegaard’s dissertation, On the Concept of Irony), really did know about Hegel, far better 
than Heiberg himself did. But unlike Heiberg, he did not take himself to have any special 
mission to “spread the word.” Surely this spreading the word is all Heiberg’s claims meant 
(rightly or wrongly), and all they were taken to mean. Stewart quotes H. L. Martensen himself 
as crediting Heiberg with being the one who had “introduced Hegel into Denmark.” Yet 
Stewart dismisses this remark by saying Martensen “probably knew better” (545). It seems 
far more likely that Martensen, like everyone else, never took Heiberg’s original claims in 
the extreme sense Stewart no doubt refutes. I see no evidence to the contrary.
Despite these criticisms, readers will appreciate Stewart’s tireless and productive labors, 
both here and elsewhere, to illuminate this neglected but important area of European 
thought.
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This book is an important effort to fill a notable void in moral and political philosophy, 
for there has been, according to Sharon K. Vaughan, “no formal study of the treatment of 
poverty in Western political thought” (1). Vaughan attempts to rectify this with a survey of 
the views of Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Rousseau, Adam Smith, Mill, de Tocqueville, Hegel, 
Marx, Rawls, and Nozick on the subject of poverty, the poor, the redistribution of wealth, 
and justice. Her effort is valuable, even if more work remains to be done.
The time is well chosen for Vaughan’s undertaking, both because of the resurgence of 
political philosophy in the past forty years and also because of a more recent interest in 
the relationship between the empirical sciences and philosophy. An account of poverty, 
and a philosophical theory of how to respond to poverty, are clearly of importance to the 
justice project, central to contemporary political philosophy; but it is unlikely to be car-
ried out well without attention to empirical details concerning the sources of poverty, the 
demographics of the poor, analyses of programs that have, and have not, been effectively 
used in the past, and the like. As Daniel Shapiro has recently shown in Is the Welfare State 
Justified? (Cambridge 2007), unexpected conclusions can be drawn when empirical evidence 
is brought to bear on orthodox liberal premises.
Vaughan’s book is helpful in drawing attention to the connection between theorizing 
about poverty and the wider ethical, political, and even metaphysical views of the authors 
she discusses. Similar attention could profitably be paid to the relationship between these 
thinkers’ views on education and ethics, politics, and metaphysics, for in many cases, the 
relationships are quite similar to those limned by Vaughan. Plato, Locke, Rousseau, and 
Mill, for example, have political concerns that have implications for poverty and education. 
But her book leaves one wanting to see her more directly take up the question of poverty in 
relation to justice, something she does not really do. Nor does she draw many bold conclu-
sions from her study; rather, she is content to provide a fairly detailed exposition of each 
thinker’s work insofar as it addressed the question of poverty.
Vaughan’s attention to the texts is both a strength and a weakness. A glance at the foot-
notes provides much assistance to anyone wanting to find out, for example, where exactly 
in the Politics Aristotle discusses poverty. At the same time, the book does not go very deeply 
into any sustained exegetical controversies; thus, it reads like a narrowly-focused general 
